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As Archilochus1 famously said, “[t]he fox knows many things, but the
hedgehog knows one big thing.”2 British philosopher Isaiah Berlin popularized
this maxim in modern times, applying the ancient fable to his study of Tolstoy’s
theory of history. In his essay “The Hedgehog and the Fox,” he drew attention to
Tolstoy’s powers of observation—so astonishing that they enabled the Russian
author to bring to life the many stories encompassed by the larger tale of Russia’s
struggle against Napoleonic France, which in turn forged Russia’s national
*
Professor of Law, The Columbus School of Law, at The Catholic University of
America. I should disclose that, in the context of my work between 2005 and 2009 as a
member of the Inter-American Juridical Committee of the Organization of American
States, and in other related work thereafter, I found Professor Kozolchyk’s scholarship and
counsel of inestimable value. This review seeks to explain why his approach to legal
harmonization in relation to economic development, as fully developed in this volume,
deserves wider circulation and attention.
1
Isaiah Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy’s View of History,
in THE PROPER STUDY OF MANKIND: AN ANTHOLOGY OF ESSAYS 436 (1998).
2
Id. (citation omitted). In Berlin’s understanding, hedgehogs subject “everything
to a single central vision, one system, less or more coherent or articulate, in terms of which
they understand, think and feel—a single, universal organising principle in terms of which
alone all that they are and say has significance.” Foxes, by contrast, “pursue many ends,
often unrelated and even contradictory, connected, if at all, only in some de facto way, for
some psychological or physiological cause, related to no moral or aesthetic principles.
These last lead lives, perform acts and entertain ideas that are centrifugal rather than
centripetal; their thought is scattered or diffused, moving on many levels, seizing upon the
essence of a vast variety of experiences and objects for that are in themselves, without,
consciously or unconsciously, seeking to fit them into, or exclude them from, any one
unchanging, all-embracing, sometimes self-contradictory and incomplete, at times
fanatical, unitary inner vision.” Id. at 436–37.
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identity. Yet Berlin also acknowledged Tolstoy’s abject failure in producing a
grand theory of history to give synthetic meaning to these events: for Tolstoy was
a fox failing miserably in an attempt to become a hedgehog.3 Boris Kozolchyk’s
Comparative Commercial Contracts: Law, Culture and Economic Development
(CCC)4 also has Tolstoyan aspirations. But in my view, Kozolchyk’s magnum
opus is indeed a work that would appeal both to foxes and to hedgehogs without
deeply dissatisfying either.
On one hand, Kozolchyk dips into autobiography, anthropology,
evolutionary biology, economics, sociology, philosophy, comparative religion,
legal history, and comparative law, to name only a few. His book sits on a
pedestal of vast learning, enticing the foxes of the world to enjoy its various parts;
thus, it is part treatise, part casebook, and part conversation with the reader. It is
therefore many books in one, written for multiple audiences. One can dip into its
various parts for provisional enrichment. Admittedly, it is not beyond criticism in
its assessment of each of these elements. Yet, in so many ways, it is an
intellectual feast of varied delicacies. Like a fox, Kozolchyk presents multiple
sharp and distinct images of reality, analyzing in remarkable detail the various
contexts in which different commercial law regimes have arisen, explaining the
underlying material contexts and mentalities upon which different legal regimes
have stood. Indeed, CCC’s various parts and even individual chapters could, with
only modest expansion, serve as coherent books themselves.
But CCC is more than that: it can be read as one sustained argument,
integrating its parts into a greater whole that places all the details the fox sees in a
central truth grasped by the hedgehog. It articulates a vision for which any
hedgehog would be proud—a sustained examination of the conditions necessary
for a law of commercial contracts to enable and empower all persons (but
especially the poor and other excluded groups) to enjoy the benefits of
development, both materially and in the expression of their basic human freedom
to develop their creative faculties. At the risk of oversimplifying, Kozolchyk
argues that it is through access to the credit necessary for small and medium sized
enterprises to take entrepreneurial risks—in a way that simultaneously protects
third parties and reflects the customary moral intuitions of the most respected
3
Id. at 498. For Berlin, “Tolstoy’s sense of reality was until the end too
devastating to be compatible with any moral ideal which he was able to construct out of the
fragments into which his intellect shivered the world, and he dedicated all his vast strength
of mind and will to the lifelong denial of this fact.” Id.
4
BORIS KOZOLCHYK, COMPARATIVE COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS: LAW, CULTURE
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2014) [hereinafter KOZOLCHYK, CCC]. One point of
concern for this reader is the number of editorial errors, which although understandable in a
1,200 plus page volume, perhaps also evidences the general decline of text editing services
in the current legal publishing environment. See also Boris Kozolchyk, The Modernization
and Harmonization of Commercial Law in the Trans-Pacific Region in the Twenty-First
Century: The Need for a New Research and Drafting Methodology, 33 ARIZ. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 25 (2016) [hereinafter Kozolchyk, Trans-Pacific] (offering a useful, but not
nearly as rich, summary of Kozolchyk’s central insights as a prelude to discussing a
strategy for future progress).
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practices in particular social settings, arguably understood as the best merchants’
understanding of good faith—that these goals can be achieved. It is, moreover, an
approach Kozolchyk finds best suited to the requirements of our age of
globalization.
Part I of this essay will explain the various parts of Kozolchyk’s
achievement, detailing the structure of the volume, its various contributions and
connections to various fields of scholarship, and its key insights as to each of its
subjects. Part II will unravel the moral and philosophical—indeed, religious—
elements of Kozolchyk’s conceptual achievement, both in its constituent element
of the archetypal merchant as a bonus vir (a good man or person) and the
conception of justice as fairness and reasonableness it is meant to serve. This part
will show that Kozolchyk joins a longstanding debate about the morality of
market society,5 one that has been given new salience as protectionist forces now
enjoy a resurgence in response to dislocations brought about by the most recent
wave of globalization.6 Part III will argue that Kozolchyk’s success as both
hedgehog and fox, and the power of his contribution to the debate about the moral
qualities of market life, can be explained by the origins of his magnum opus: a
career of engaged practical scholarship, in part as Director of The National Law
Center for Inter-American Free Trade (NLCIFT), affiliated with The University of
Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law. As Director, he has played a central
role in developing practical instruments for legal harmonization in the Western
Hemisphere, especially between the United States and the Caribbean Basin
countries. This part will track the increasing influence of Kozolchyk’s vision in
legal developments in the Western hemisphere through his influence on
developments under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and in
the Specialized Conference on Private International Law (CIDIP),7 which operates
under the auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS). Finally, Part
IV of this essay, drawing in part on suggestions in CCC but more significantly on
literature concerning the creation and erosion of the social norms supporting trust
in economic life, will identify challenges that trade with China may pose for
commercial law reasoning and practices based on Kozolchyk’s understanding of
the bonus vir. In light of this concern, it concludes that CCC will serve as an
inestimable resource for those interested in the evolution of Western hemispheric
5

See Albert O. Hirschman, Rival Views of Market Society, in RIVAL VIEWS OF
MARKET SOCIETY AND OTHER RECENT ESSAYS 105 (1986) (detailing the two strands of
orientation of the moral effects of market life: one—the so-called “doux-commerce”
thesis—under which market life instills personal virtue; the other—the so-called “selfdestruction” thesis—under which market life is corrosive of private virtue and ultimately
erodes the moral foundations of private life necessary for its survival).
6
See generally Mark Blyth, Capitalism in Crisis: What Went Wrong and What
Comes Next, 95 FOREIGN AFF. 172 (2016) (reviewing several books offering competing
views on the sustainability of modern capitalism).
7
The CIDIP’s abbreviation follows its Spanish title, “Conferencia Especializada
para el Derecho Internacional Privado.” ORGANIZACIÓN DE LOS ESTADOS AMERICANOS,
https://www.oas.org/dil/esp/derecho_internacional_privado_desarrollo.htm (last visited
Sept. 29, 2016).
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and East Asian Trade under the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TTP),
providing another generation of scholars and practitioners with a welcoming
launch pad for their own efforts to unite theory with practice as faithfully as
Kozolchyk’s exemplary effort in this volume, perhaps serving as a legacy even
greater than CCC itself.
I. THE FOX’S MANY INSIGHTS
Kozolchyk’s book is divided into five parts and totals thirty chapters,
beginning with a theoretical framework and practical vocabulary founded on
Roman law, moving to the medieval structure of guilds and notaries to restrain
trade, exploring the emergence of Western European codes law in the ashes of
medievalism, then showing counter-examples where less progress was made in
Latin America, the Soviet Union and China, and finally reaching the apotheosis of
commercial law in Anglo-American invention. Reading CCC from beginning to
end takes the reader through a wonderful journey in legal history, sociology,
politics, and economics through many lands, a large number of which will be
foreign territory to readers who have specialized only in particular disciplines.
Yet Kozolchyk is a superb guide.
Part I outlines the book’s basic themes, exploring what Kozolchyk calls
the “logic of the reasonable,” particularly as expressed in the insightful opinions
of the giants of the common law, Lord Mansfield and Judges Friendly and
Cardozo.8 Part I then lays the foundation for a history of comparative law by
explaining through an anthropological lens the role executory promises play in
facilitating the provision of credit to enable production and exchange in the shift
from agricultural to commercial society.9 But the real payoff in these chapters
comes in detailed case studies: one concerning the cultural context for
competition;10 the other, an illustrative case study of Kozolchyk’s own effort in
the OAS Model Law on Secured Transactions to adapt modern commercial
understandings to the Latin American cultural context.11 These case studies
(presented in the form of appendices to introductory chapters) immediately allow
the reader to apprehend the specific factual contexts in which Kozolchyk’s
8

See KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 54–65.
See id. at 81–102.
10
See id. at 22–34 (discussing erroneous assumptions about Japanese business
culture that might have mislead the U.S. Supreme Court in the predatory pricing decision,
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)) (citations
omitted).
11
See id. at 66–79. See Organization of American States, Model Inter-American
Law on Secured Transactions, http://www.oas.org/dil/uniform%20law%20review.pdf
(2002) [hereinafter OAS, Model Secured Transactions]. This Model Law was in turn based
on 12 principles produced by a drafting conference composed of Western hemispheric
experts meeting under the auspices of the NLCIFT. See Meeting of OAS-CIDIP VI
Drafting Committee on Secured Transactions Conference Transcript, 18 ARIZ. J. INT’L
COMP. L. 334 (2001).
9
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methodology can be employed. Yet, as a prelude to his discussion of the OAS
Model Law on Secured Transactions, Kozolchyk also plants the seeds of the
volume’s central message with an account of Emperor Constantine’s repeal of the
Pactum Commissorium. This traditional Roman right permitted creditors to
repossess or foreclose on collateral, thus facilitating the flow of credit.
Constantine, in Kozolchyk’s telling, judged it more important to enforce a
prohibition against usury inspired by Christian theology and to protect
impoverished Christian debtors from rapacious creditors.12 Part I thus concludes
with an exquisite introduction to Roman law as the foundation for the evolution of
commercial systems in medieval and modern Europe, which, while complete in
itself, also forms the legal-factual matrix for all further Western discussion of
commercial law. Here, Kozolchyk introduces the concept of Ulpian’s bonus vir as
a legal standard and, with a series of excerpted opinions from the Corpus Juris
Civilis, brings to life that Roman concept, which might have served as an
alternative to Constantine’s blunt rejection of all creditor rights.13
Part II of CCC takes the reader through a detailed study of medieval
commercial practices, bringing to life the practical limitations imposed on
commerce and market access by guilds, agency rules, and notaries. Here,
Kozolchyk makes clear that the combination of these rules limited commerce—
particularly through their failure to protect those relying on the apparent authority
of commercial agents. This was in part because the conceptual problem based on
the Roman theory of typification of contracts, under which a kind of numerus
clausus (closed number) principle limited the kinds of contractual exchanges that
might be enforced, thereby excluding theories of unilateral contract or reliancebased reasoning.14 This theoretical prison served only to reduce protection for
third parties and thereby to obstruct the flow of credit. Perhaps more importantly,
it gave rise to a perception that commerce was ignoble or corrupt; for example, the
paradigm of the “Picaresque” or shifty tradesman in Spanish medieval culture
assumed that such a merchant would pass on bad debts in a kind of habitual Ponzi
scheme.15 (Much later in the volume, in one charming dialogue with a Mexican
law professor about Mexican cultural attitudes, Kozolchyk’s Mexican interlocutor
refers to the “natural or God-given right to smuggle.”16) Indeed, high levels of
corruption prompted high levels of regulation and authentication, thus
engendering the rise of guilds and notaries, which (despite their intention to
prevent corruption) in effect foreclosed competition and facilitated the extraction
of bribes and other side payments.17 Yet Kozolchyk also shows that formalistic
rules promising legal certainty and barring the enforcement of unilateral promises
or rights based on reasonable reliance induced market exchanges through
circumvention (what he calls a “simulation” of a real exchange based on unilateral
12
13
14
15
16
17

See KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 70.
See id. at 128-35.
See id. at 150-51.
See id. at 143-45.
Id. at 538.
See KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 191-242.
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promises or reliance through the legal form of a false bilateral exchange).18 But
these fraudulent (albeit practical) instruments came at the price of initially higher
transactional costs from requiring unnecessary false formalities, offered less value
than fully-legal transactions (since the possibility they could later be deemed
fraudulent forced market participants to discount the price they would be willing
to pay to accept that legal risk), and further damaged the reputation of merchants
for honesty and reliability, with effects well into modernity.19 Most critically,
Kozolchyk shows that the principal vehicle for circumvention of the dogmatic
rules against usury, unilateral commitments, and reliance-based reasoning came
primarily from the religiously-inspired practices of the medieval Jewish
brotherhood of merchants, who served as reliable intermediaries willing to enforce
unilateral commitments upon which contract parties could reasonably rely.20 As
discussed in Part II of this essay, this insight becomes the root premise in the
hedgehog’s understanding of the foundations for commerce.21
Parts III and IV of CCC form a pair, though they can be studied
separately. Part III addresses the emergence of modern Western European codes
and the varying degrees of progress they have made in freeing themselves from
the chains of medieval dogmatism. In exploring post-Enlightenment European
codification efforts, Kozolchyk crucially differentiates between the French and
German experience. French influence peaked in the immediate aftermath of Latin
American independence following the Napoleonic Wars, as Latin American
codification efforts were crucially influenced by the French model. Rationalism
and deductive logic,22 coupled with the French Revolutionary (as well as
Napoleon’s own personal) prejudice against merchants and in favor of debtor
small-landholding bourgeoisie,23 resulted in a Code Civil that was dominated by
the amorphous concept of causa. Briefly, this concept can be understood to
sanction only specific kinds of contracts; thus, it prevented the natural evolution
of commercial instruments to create new forms of contracts, or soften the
requirements for enforcement of existing contractual forms, to meet changing
social and economic needs.24 French law thus evidenced tortured decisional
reasoning in concrete cases as the gap between the Code Civil and the Code de
18

Id. at 150–52 (quoting Raymond de Roover’s description of the typical
“simulation” of an exchange transaction of foreign currency, coupled with a commission, to
disguise the charging of interest on a loan). Id. at 510–13 (discussing the Mexican practice
of fraudulent or disguised transactions, “simulations,” designed to circumvent legal
prohibitions) (citations omitted).
19
See id. at 145–48.
20
See id. at 153–63. Kozolchyk acknowledges that the recorded practices of
English wool merchants may also have played a role in circumventing medieval Canonical
restrictions on the advance of credit to facilitate production and exchange and the special
influence of Henry VIII’s 1545 Statute of Usury, which regulated rather than prohibited the
charging of interest. KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 156.
21
See infra Part II.
22
See KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 245–68.
23
See id. at 268–80.
24
See id. at 280–96.
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Commerce of 1807, on one hand, and commercial realities in which they were
applied on the other, became insurmountable during the explosive growth of
industry and enterprise in the 19th and 20th centuries. Unlike German law,
French law to this day limits reliance-based reasoning and provides excessive
protection to familial interests in property, thus frustrating the protection of thirdparty interests and thereby limiting the development of robust markets protecting
creditors and enabling the supply of credit.25 In a wonderful case study of the
Mexican Civil Code (which is based on French law) Kozolchyk shows the barriers
this French inheritance raised for even the simplest real estate transactions, given
the absence of reliable mechanisms to ensure the transfer of title pursuant to
agreement or even to structure enforceable escrow agreements that could
overcome the lack of trust between strangers in commercial transactions.26
In contrast, the German Codes—both the German Commercial Code of
1897 (HGB), and the German Civil Code of 1900 (BGB)—drew on a century of
practice rather than abstract theory. Thus, the needs of emerging German
industry, agriculture, commerce, and especially finance set the context for more
open-textured legal language that in a sense ratified emerging German practice.27
These Codes did not employ a causa-inspired numerus clausus approach to the
validity of contracts, thus opening the door to the negotiation and enforcement of
unilateral merchant promises, such as bills of exchange by bona fide purchasers
for value, and approving the emerging commercial instruments for supplying
credit. Moreover, unlike French law’s reliance on strict rules, the German Codes
relied on principles of good faith—both as a general duty in the performance,
execution and even the negotiation of contracts and as the basis for allowing
courts to adjust the meaning of contracts to meet new circumstances.28 Kozolchyk
here observes that German doctrinal writing and codification practice were
immensely consequential in the United States through their influence on Karl
Llewellyn, the chief draftsman of the Uniform Commercial Code,29 thus
reinforcing the different trajectories of the United States and Latin America in the
development of their respective commercial laws and foreshadowing Kozolchyk’s
detailed analysis of the characteristics of Anglo-American commercial law in Part
V of CCC.30
Good teachers teach by counter-example, just as good first-year contracts
teachers sometimes teach the common law of contract by contrasting it with UCC
solutions; and Part IV reveals that Kozolchyk, whatever else he may be
(economist, anthropologist, historian, or philosopher), is a fabulous teacher. It
provides a detailed analysis of the three cases of Latin America, the former Soviet
Union, and China, in which various factors—colonial heritage, what Kozolchyk
25

See id. at 297–373.
See id. at 373–76.
27
See KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 381–96 (discussing German commercial
practice and the role of scholarship).
28
See id. at 413–38.
29
See id. at 440–49.
30
See infra text accompanying note 35.
26
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calls the “invertebrate” character of a legal system, and a dysfunctional cultural
commitment to preferring family members to strangers—frustrated the emergence
of commercial legal systems. For this reader, these are the most enriching studies
in CCC. Kozolchyk reveals in excruciating detail the many limitations caused by
“familism” in Latin America, which unduly privileges family interests at the
expense of innocent third parties.31 Similarly, he shows that reasonable third
parties could find no protection from authoritarian-legalism in the former Soviet
Union, as well perhaps as in Russia today,32 under what he calls an “invertebrate”
system of commercial law—a law
whose factual and normative components were so imprecise that
they enlarged the power (and all too often filled the pockets) of
government officials, starting with the policeman who waived a
fine or prohibition in exchange for a bribe, and extending to the
directors of state enterprises and planners of the USSR’s
economy.33
The combination of familism and authoritarian-legalism potentially at work in
modern China posed obvious challenges for the development of global commercial
law and will be the subject of the final part of this essay.34
Part V is the culmination of CCC, for it analyzes in detail the
mechanisms through which modern English and American commercial law
facilitate economic exchange. These chapters serve as a mini-course in the law of
international business transactions, as well as comparative modern commercial
law, and as a superb introduction for “civilians” (i.e., those trained in the civil law
tradition) to the sources and methods of Anglo-American law and the socioeconomic contexts in which the British and US systems arose.35
For the purposes of acquiring a firm grasp of the hedgehog’s vision
underlying CCC, which is the subject of Part II of this essay, one should give a
close reading to Kozolchyk’s masterful recital of the emergence of the modern
law validating commercial and standby letters of credit (LOC). This detailed case
study focuses on the practices of merchant bankers and the private codification of
their best practices through multiple versions of the Uniform Customs and
Practices for Documentary Credits (UCP) promulgated by the International
Chamber of Commerce.36 The UCP’s terms became the law of the contracts in
this specialized context and set the basic expectations of the parties in modern
31

See KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 475–543.
See id. at 545–621.
33
Id. at 546.
34
See infra text accompanying note 109.
35
See generally KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 749–858.
36
See George L. Ridgeway, MERCHANTS OF PEACE: THE HISTORY OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (1959), cited in KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4,
at 1058 n.114 (detailing the history of the ICC, including its role in the development of the
UCP).
32
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LOC practice, which for decades has facilitated international exchange by
providing a secure means of payment, enforceable notwithstanding breach or
other infirmities in their related buyer-seller goods and shipment contracts. By
assuring payment based on the presentation of documents of title alone, which
thereby gives banks an enforceable collection mechanism against collateral, the
provision of credit and payment are assured. Thus, like possession of a negotiable
instrument in the hands of a bona fide purchaser for value, the beneficiary of an
LOC can enforce, subject to very limited exceptions, the instrument
notwithstanding underlying defects in the exchange between the parties
originating the instrument. With certainty of enforceability, moreover, these
instruments can serve also as a form of credit (since beneficiaries of LOCs, for an
appropriate discount reflecting the parties’ different needs for immediate funds,
can transfer their collection rights to purchasers for value, who then may enforce
their rights to collection); and, much like accounts receivables in Anglo-American
jurisprudence, they can serve as a form of collateral for the extension of credit.37
In short, LOCs not only overcome the legal risk of nonpayment endemic in
international trade, but they also facilitate the flow of credit to those seeking to
enter global markets. While this brief and imprecise summary cannot do justice to
Kozolchyk’s fox-like description of the legal advances in LOC law in the last
century, it does provide a segue for addressing Kozolchyk’s hedgehog-like overall
thesis explaining how instruments of such global importance as LOCs emerged, in
fact, out of legal nothingness.
Kozolchyk proceeds to show that it was only when bankers made what
one might call a “leap of faith” that LOCs emerged. Less metaphorically,
Kozolchyk notes that relatively equal bankers, who sometimes are issuing banks
and sometimes are collecting banks (and therefore had an interest in respecting the
interests of other parties because the shoe, so to speak, may soon be on the other
foot), initiated the practice of commercial letters of credit through an
unenforceable act of generosity. The bank issuing the LOC would give
“something of value to the beneficiary (the authorization to draw) without
receiving an immediate equivalent from him.”38 That the “issuing bank gained the
trust of the beneficiary and of subsequent participants in the transaction, including
its correspondent banks, for the issuing bank was sufficient consideration.”39 But
here the word “consideration” is used in a non-technical legal sense, since it is at
odds with the general understanding that past consideration does not constitute a
bargained-for exchange. Rather, it is a gift that seeks to induce reciprocal
altruism.

37

See KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 1049–51.
Id. at 1053.
39
See id. at 1053, 1075–80 (summarizing these developments and expressing
concern that the effort to maximize bank shareholder value is causing the proliferation of
unethical practices inconsistent with ethically sound customs that gave rise to the modern
LOC).
38
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II. THE HEDGEHOG’S GREAT TRUTH
Because Kozolchyk’s central insight regarding the gift-giving origins of
even such a sophisticated and globalized transaction as the modern LOC comes at
the end of the book, one could also read CCC backwards, as if unpeeling the
layers of an onion or, as might an archeologist, uncovering the layers of
foundations of an important site until one reaches the earliest forms of civilization.
This thought-experiment might help a reader to develop a clearer understanding of
the hedgehog’s vision.
Thus, modern Anglo-American commercial law that facilitates
enforcement of unbargained-for offers in specific contexts,40 relies on sectoral
customary practices as a critical measure of good faith,41 and effectively protects
third parties acting in good faith through judicially-authorized specific
performance and self-help remedies, such as providing secured parties an
immediate right to take possession of the collateral after default.42 This current
synthesis could be viewed as building on the advances made by German code
drafters through a somewhat amorphous conception of good faith,43 although the
BGB and HGB provided more legal clarity and third-party protection than French
and Latin American Codes,44 not to mention the more primitive conceptions of socalled invertebrate and authoritarian law. But these modern systems all found
their sources in the central dilemma posed by Roman and medieval law’s search
for commercial law principles only through deductive reasoning from initial
premises grounded in an Aristotelian pursuit of the “essential” elements of
commutative justice in a fair exchange, including a prohibition of interest, a
theory that fatally ignored social facts.45 Yet the genius of Roman law during the
Republican praetorian period was precisely to enable the system of praetors as
promulgators of legal formulas, iudices as triers of fact, and jurisconsults as
external experts, working together, to adapt Roman law to changing facts—both
to soften the rigors of the civil law with a ius honorarium, much like the English
Chancellor’s invention of equitable remedies; and to adapt the Roman civil law to
form a ius gentium for Romans and non-Romans alike.
In sum, for wisdom on how to proceed in the modern world trading
system’s attempt to harmonize now globally multiple legal systems in the story,
Kozolchyk returns to the first phases of globalization in antiquity and that first
effort to construct a living ius gentium.46 Viewed this way, CCC itself reads like
Euclid’s elements, which have influenced so many political thinkers (Abraham

40

See id. at 908–14 (especially the so-called “merchant’s firm offer”).
See id. at 972–77.
42
See KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 1162–63, 1184–88, 1211.
43
See id. at 437–38 (the requirement of “Treu und Glauben”).
44
See id. at 435–36 (providing an extremely useful chart comparing the
differences).
45
See id. at 149–51 (citations omitted).
46
See id. at 105–25.
41
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Lincoln47 and Thomas Hobbes48 among them) to believe that agreement on
foundational assumptions is at the core of reasoned discourse, even in political
economy. It may be ironic, however, that the gist of Kozolchyk’s argument—
namely, that deductive systems of commercial law impede the development of
commerce—is presented in the form of a series of deductive inferences from a set
of foundational postulates.
At its root, however, Kozolchyk’s chain of argument is premised on a
particular conception of human nature. Significantly, he closes the volume with
an attack on the Law & Economics movement, which he believes is based on a
flawed understanding of human motivation as entirely selfish. Law grounded on
that premise, he argues, fails to recognize the socio-biologist’s “eusociality,” or an
anthropologist’s “reciprocal altruism,” in our natures. It fails to perceive that the
best practices of the most honorable merchant (Ulpian’s bonus vir) are the true
and therefore most effective measure for law and its adjudication in a way that
serves the common good.49 In this sense, while rejecting Aristotle’s essentialism
as a logical system, he reclaims another part of Aristotelian thought—namely, the
belief that moral virtue lies in the habitual pursuit of excellence.50
Indeed, one could go further, for Kozolchyk’s conception of human
nature arguably is grounded—not just on sociobiology, anthropology and abstract
moral philosophy—but perhaps more deeply on a religiously-inspired insight as to
commercial morality and morality more generally: namely, Rabbi Hillel’s
understanding that selfishness and altruism must find a reasonable
accommodation in human life, for “if I am not for myself, who will be for me, and
if I am [only] for myself, what am I.”51 In Part III, while discussing and
criticizing the formalistic conception of virtue in medieval fair courts as part of
the process of European codification, he alludes also to Talmudic thought’s Fable
of the Evil Impulse. This thirteen-century old poem warns that any attempt to
destroy all “evil desire” will only bring about “passion, avarice and greed,” which
must then entail the recognition that in human life, “[t]here will be good in evil, as

47
See generally Antonio F. Perez, Lincoln’s Legacy for American International
Law, 28 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 167, 225–26 (2014) (discussing Lincoln’s encounter with
Euclid in the late 1840s and the role it played in helping Lincoln to view the Declaration’s
commitment to equality, rather than the Constitution’s rotten compromise, as the
foundational axiom for political discussion of the question of slavery).
48
See generally Hardy Grant, Geometry and Politics: Mathematics in the Thought
of Thomas Hobbes, 63 MATHEMATICS MAG. 147 (1990) (discussing Hobbes’ effort in
LEVIATHAN to move from foundational premises to a theory of politics).
49
See KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 1233–45.
50
See Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea (Nichomachean Ethics), in THE BASIC WORKS
OF ARISTOTLE 952–59 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941); see also ST. THOMAS AQUINAS,
COMMENTARY ON ARISTOTLE’S NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 103–06 (C.J. Litzinger trans.,
Dumb Ox Books rev. ed. 1993).
51
See KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 169 n.142 (citations omitted). This
moderate altruism or “eusociality” finds its roots, for Kozolchyk, also in the Behavioral
Darwinist theories of E.O. Wilson. See id. at 8–10 (citations omitted).

76

Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law

Vol. 34, No. 1

2016

there is evil in good.”52 This ethic characterized the Jewish communities of
medieval traders53 and could be observed even more clearly in the life story of
Baron von Rothschild, who exemplified the “brotherly” and moderately altruistic
values Kozolchyk deems characteristic of the archetypal, or most respected,
merchant.54 In short, the religiously inspired values of the medieval and modern
52

Id. at 317 n.120. It is impossible to pass on this thought without recognizing its
potentially Machiavellian implications. For a Catholic, this Talmudic thought could be
interpreted to challenge the traditional Catholic teaching that one ought not to do evil so
that good may come of it. See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶¶ 1749–61, http://
www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p3s1c1a4.htm (last visited Oct. 20,
2016). But that principle is qualified by the principle of “double effect,” namely, that mere
awareness that an act motivated by a good purpose may have evil or harmful effects does
not necessarily make the act wrongful, but an understanding that significant harms
outweighing the benefit are likely would call into question otherwise well-motivated acts.
See Doctrine of Double Effect, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Sept. 23, 2014), http://plato
.stanford.edu/entries/double-effect/. Here, the thought of German sociologist Max Weber
becomes helpful in situating Kozolchyk’s position. Weber, in a seminal lecture and essay
that helped to shape public discourse in post-WWI Germany, distinguished in politics
between an “ethic of ultimate ends” where one pursues an absolutist agenda and an “ethic
of responsibility” under which one takes account of the consequences of one’s high-minded
goals. See Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, reprinted in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN
SOCIOLOGY 77 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. trans., 1946). Kozolchyk’s analysis,
properly understood, embodies an “ethic of responsibility,” under which “normative charity
focuses not only on the beneficence of an act, but on its empowering effects” too. See
KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 318. Thus, if commercial rules unrealistically
grounded on behavioral assumptions of pure normative charity result in poverty, the
principle of double effect in tandem with an ethic of responsibility would allow one to
judge that rules based on normative charity alone must be modified.
53
See KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 153–63 (drawing attention to the role of
Maimonides’ teachings) (citations omitted). See also Paul R. Milgrom et al., The Role of
Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the
Champagne Fairs, 2 ECON. & POL. 1 (1990) (discussing an economic model on the role of
private judges in medieval fairs).
54
See KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 397–407 (relying heavily on acclaimed
biography NIALL FERGUSON, HOUSE OF ROTHSCHILD (1999)) (citation omitted). That said, it
is possible that Kozolchyk’s argument is subject to counter-examples showing that trust
networks thrive only in oligopolized markets, where the sanction of exclusion from a close
knit community substitutes for legal enforcement mechanisms. As Barak Richman argues,
the network of largely Jewish diamond dealers in New York City’s diamond district has
unraveled precisely because its privileged position has dissolved, reducing the benefits of
membership and the opportunity cost of exclusion. See generally Barak D. Richman, An
Autopsy of Cooperation: Diamond Dealers and the Limits of Trust-Based Exchange (Apr.
13, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2764470. With the rise of
alternative channels of diamond supply—new Australian production mediated by South
Asian merchants—coupled with De Beers’ new strategy of vertical integration in place of
using New York intermediaries, Jewish merchants in New York no longer perceive the
benefits of observing the norms that made them indispensable intermediaries in facilitating
credit sales in the market for a product, such as diamonds, that can easily evade formal,
legal collection mechanisms. See id.
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communities of Jewish traders and financiers serve as the practical exemplars of
Kozolchyk’s theory.
Fleshing out this theory, the archetypal merchant, living a practical
morality of moderate altruism, becomes the root premise for commercial
development. Here, the bon mot (or clever phrase) becomes the mot juste (or
exact phrase) in Kozolchyk’s discourse, as he employs the term “nuclear”
elements of the exchange to argue that the original or “nuclear” parties to a
transaction, such as the original creditor and debtor, must give third parties the
same treatment in good faith they give each other, even though these third parties
are strangers and are not part of the “nuclear” or original parties to the exchange.55
Thus, the bon mot, “nuclear”—an apparent analogy to nuclear physics and the
constituent parties of all matter—may also, perhaps in an unintended pun, serve as
the mot juste that reflects Kozolchyk’s core idea that enhanced good faith morality
of the archetypal merchant gives to third parties equality of treatment as if they
were initial parties to the exchange, as if they were the members of the very same
“nuclear” families or kinship groups. This line of thought is consistent with
Kozolchyk’s belief that the modern trade concept of “national treatment,” which
has become central to the WTO, GATT, NAFTA, and CAFTA, to name only a
few trade agreements, is connected to the medieval idea of the so-called “peace of
the market.”56 For Kozolchyk, these successful commercial practices, such as
both national treatment and the medieval peace of the market, are manifestations
of the behavioral regularity, custom, or ethical or philosophical principle
(depending on the disciplinary focus one may employ) that strangers ought to be
treated as “brothers” or “neighbors.” Thus, in the case of credit systems, it is only
through a rich understanding of the interaction between selfishness and altruism,
and a firm grasp of the particular factual nuclear elements of a commercial
practice, that comparative legal reform can enable law and lawyers to become a
vehicle for doing well by doing good.57 In CCC’s Epilogue, Kozolchyk returns to
this foundational thesis, observing that globalization, growing interaction, and the
accumulation of experience may facilitate the emergence of the best practices of
the archetypal global merchant.58
One can extrapolate the beneficial
consequences for global economic development if Kozolchyk’s vision, as
hedgehog, can be universalized.

55

See KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 1034–38.
See id. at 304–05 (the medieval institution of the so-called “peace of the market,”
which provided for safe conducts immunizing traders and their goods from capture under
letters of marque and reprisal).
57
See id. at 1038–39.
58
See id. at 1247–48.
56
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For Latin Americans, however, living under a pervasively Catholic
culture and an Aristotelian intellectual tradition, Kozolchyk’s rejection of
Aristotelian “essentialism” and its “static” conception of contractual relations and
appeal to Talmudic principles may well pose a challenge.59 Indeed, Kozolchyk
even wants to make clear that Christian charity “as a form of doing business and
judicial decision-making suffers from inherently crippling limitations.”60 Yet,
despite Kozolchyk’s frank appraisal that dogmatic medieval Catholic legal
thought’s misunderstanding of the role of money and interest (with its pre-Marxist
distrust of capital as such), it seems that his understanding of archetypal merchant
conduct arguably overlaps with Christian moral teaching. Like Kozolchyk,
Catholic thought sees virtue as habitual practice.61 Moreover, central to Catholic
social teaching, which informs Catholic understanding of economic life as well, is
the protection of the stranger; for, in response to the question “Who is my
neighbor?”—by a lawyer who seeks to know how to interpret Jesus’s instruction
to love not only God but also one’s neighbor—Jesus tells the Parable of the Good
Samaritan.62 Latin American Catholics would acknowledge that Talmudic
teachings that are consistent with Catholic intuitions might serve as a basis for
legal reform, and surely they would acknowledge that the Roman Church’s
medieval misunderstanding of the role of credit has been transcended by the
modern Church’s acceptance of the potential virtues of private property and
market life.63 If so, an interfaith dialogue between the Talmudic insights
59

See id. at 150.
KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 317 (purporting to disagree with Amalia D.
Kessler, Enforcing Virtue: Social Norms and Self-Interest in an Eighteenth-Century
Merchant Court, 22 L. & HIST. REV. 71 (2004)).
61
See AQUINAS, supra note 50 (“Lecture VI: Virtue, a Kind of Habit”).
62
See Luke 10:25–37 (Jerusalem).
63
See, e.g., Pope John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Centesimus Annus ¶ 42 (May, 1
1991), http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_01
051991_centesimus-annus.html [hereinafter Centesimus Annus] (giving qualified
acceptance to capitalism). See also Michael Novak, Capitalism Rightly Understood: The
View of Christian Humanism, ETERNAL WORLD TELEVISION NETWORK, http://www.ewtn
.com/library/business/fr91401.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2016) (providing a sophisticated
account of the balance John Paul II struck between the virtues embedded in capitalism and
the necessary elements of a reform agenda). Indeed, John Paul II recognized, like the
Talmudists, that “where self-interest is violently suppressed, it is replaced by a burdensome
system of bureaucratic control which dries up the wellsprings of initiative and creativity.”
Centesimus Annus, supra, ¶ 25. See also MICHAEL NOVAK, THE CATHOLIC ETHIC AND THE
SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (1993). It should be acknowledged, however, that the Church
continues to struggle in its understanding of the nature of economic life. Most recently,
Pope Francis opined: “In fact, if the market is governed solely by the principle of the
equivalence in value of exchanged goods, it cannot produce the social cohesion that it
requires in order to function well.” Pope Benedict XVI, Encyclical Letter Caritas in
Veritate ¶ 35 (June 29, 2009), http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/encyclicals
/documents/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20090629_caritas-in-veritate.html. See also Pope Francis,
Apostolic Exhortation Evangelii Gaudium (Nov. 24, 2013), http://w2.vatican.va/content
/francesco/en/apost_exhortations/documents/papa-francesco_esortazione-ap_20131124
60
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Kozolchyk brings to bear and a modern Catholic understanding of the role of the
market and free trade in eliminating global poverty would be in order. In
promoting this foundational dialogue, which could extend to other faiths and
secular traditions, Kozolchyk’s work thus serves far deeper purposes than even he
may realize.
Indeed, Kozolchyk’s central Talmudic insights can also be located in a
tension, not just between different faith traditions, but also found among those
who reason from non-Judeo-Christian or wholly secular perspectives. This
debate, or tension, is also a longstanding dialectic in the market’s encounter with
morality. In a recent formulation, political economist and intellectual historian
Albert Hirschman famously distinguished between the so-called sweet or “douxcommerce” thesis and the so-called “self-destruction” thesis. Under the former—
long associated with the thought of Montesquieu, David Hume, and Adam
Smith—market society is conducive to good manners, opposition to violence,
frugality, punctuality, and probity.64 So-called “scientific” socialists, such as
Marx, advancing the self-destruction thesis argued that the internal logic of
capitalism would bring about “an ever-more numerous and more class-conscious
and combative proletariat.”65 Meanwhile, conservatives, such as Bolingbroke,
feared that “all social bonds were dissolved through money.”66
But for Hirschman, rather than empirical questions, these competing
theses evidence merely the cycling of ideas, since the so-called doux-commerce
thesis prompted the self-destruction thesis, each of which continued to be
reformulated again and again within various disciplines. In the 20th century,
Horkheimer’s Frankfurt School’s neo-Marxism argued, like Bolingbroke, that
Western civilization was destroying the intellectual and cultural basis for that
civilization’s existence.67 Meanwhile, conservative self-destruction theories were
reformulated in rationalist terms—such as Schumpeter “creative destruction” of
existing markets through technological advance, leaving incumbent workers and
businesses behind with enormous adjustment costs;68 as the game-theoretic
account of the prevalence of self-interested behavior in strategic interactions
popularized by the Prisoners’ Dilemma; 69 or, as Kozolchyk might add, the “Law
& Economics” movement.70 And, in a work that would be of particular interest to
Kozolchyk, Hirschman refers to German sociologist Simmel’s observation that
_evangelii-gaudium.html. Sadly, this is based on a fundamental misconception, since
market exchanges are based precisely on the different perception that market participants
have about the value of exchanged goods, thereby giving rise to an exchange under which
both sides believe their positions have improved, which in turn furthers social cohesion by
bringing the parties together in a mutually-satisfying exchange.
64
See Hirschman, supra note 5, at 107–09.
65
Id. at 112.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 115–16 (citations omitted).
68
Id. at 114–15 (citations omitted).
69
Hirschman, supra note 5, at 117 (citations omitted).
70
See supra text accompanying note 49.
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“the advanced division of labor in modern society, and the importance of credit
for the functioning of the economy, rest on, and promote, a high degree of
truthfulness in social relations.”71 Hirschman even recognized that the douxcommerce thesis seemed to have the greatest resiliency against the self-destruction
thesis in the context of studies of international trade, for “[o]nly with regard to
international trade was it still asserted from time to time, usually as an
afterthought, that expanding transactions would bring, not only mutual material
gains, but also some fine by-products in the cultural and moral realms, such as
intellectual cross-fertilization and mutual understanding and peace.”72
It goes without saying that, in the context of this longstanding debate
over the degree to which market society inculcates, destroys, or ultimately must
depend on virtue among market participants, Kozolchyk’s work is a welcome
theoretical—but more importantly, empirical—contribution. Indeed, the logic of
the reasonable is not for merchants alone. Kozolchyk’s message to transactional
lawyers in the emerging global environment is that, in addition to understanding
the best practices of any setting, they must take on the responsibility of becoming
the “guardians” of the good faith of the individual transaction.73 For lawyers and
lawyer-students of the Talmud or the New Testament, as well as other faiths and
secular religions, there could not be a more inspirational note upon which to end
so rich and stimulating a volume as CCC.
III. THE OAS AND CIDIP: THEORY ROOTED IN EXPERIENCE
For those looking for inspiration in practice rather than theory,
Kozolchyk’s role in the Inter-American process of legal cooperation provides
numerous examples of how his methodology can produce results. Indeed, it is the
wealth of experience that has given rise to CCC that is perhaps is the best possible
explanation for the quality of Kozolchyk’s theoretical contribution to the process
of legal harmonization in the Western Hemisphere. That process, as this Part will
also show, provides examples of the consequences for failing to follow
Kozolchyk’s precepts, providing additional evidence for the need to take CCC
seriously.
It is necessary to begin with the observation that Kozolchyk’s work on
comparative law and economic development grows out of his personal history,
beginning in Cuba under the constraints the civil law tradition imposed on his own
father’s activities as a merchant. These life experiences return throughout CCC in
various forms and delightfully inform the reader of the man behind the
manuscript.74 But the intellectual journey of these beginnings launched
71

Hirschman, supra note 5, at 121 (citations omitted).
Id. at 118.
73
KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 1247.
74
Kozolchyk discloses that his mother’s entire family, it turns out, was
exterminated by the Nazis. See id. at 377. And he recounts the medieval atrocities of the
Frankfort Ghetto, which nonetheless eventually became the launching point for the
72
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Kozolchyk on a voyage through Latin American, European, and American legal
scholarship, sent him to field research in Central America and Mexico, and finally
brought him to port at The University of Arizona and the NCLFT.75 Under
Kozolchyk’s stewardship, the NCLFT became a forum for technical cooperation
among commercial practitioners in the NAFTA countries in a number of areas:
among others, the development of codes of conduct that would facilitate the
development of common standards for activities as mundane as cross-border
check clearing, the checking of letter of credit documents for technical compliance
with required elements, and the effective transfer of truckers bills of lading.76 In
these efforts, Kozolchyk, perhaps like a religious convert from a childhood civil
law education to an adult faith in common-law methodology, followed a common
law lawyer’s practice of fully understanding all the material—as he would say,
“nuclear” facts; only such understanding would yield a basis for finding the
critical elements that would need to be reformed to ensure the durable success of
these exchanges by means of realizing the reciprocally-altruistic behavioral
standards of the archetypal merchant.77 In the case of developing a “roadmap” for
effective truck bills of lading, for example, this required NLCIFT researchers to
be “present during the issuances of truck bills of lading in Canada, the United
States, and Mexico” and “when cargo shipped from Canada or the United States
was delivered to the consignee/buyers in Mexico.”78 In the case of developing
common standards for the examination of letter of credit documents before their
acceptance for payment, in implementation of new UCP rules, this entailed
working with bankers associations in the United States and Mexico to conduct a
document-by-document, objection-by-objection review of each group’s practices,

Rothschilds, whose role in the development of European commerce plays a central part in
Kozolchyk’s story. See id. at 397–99; see also supra text accompanying note 54. But he
also tells the far more heart-warming story of his introduction to business as a part-time silk
cloth salesman in his father’s store in Cuba, where he learned the importance of credibility
and trust in market life. See KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 489–90. He had, in fact,
replaced a much taller salesman, and the usual measure of length of the cloth, and therefore
the price of the quantity to be sold, in terms of the length of the salesman’s arm needed to
be adjusted to take into account his somewhat shorter stature, a limitation with which no
doubt many of us can empathize. See id.
75
See Staff Members, NATIONAL LAW CENTER FOR INTER-AMERICAN FREE TRADE
(NLCIFT), http://natlaw.com/staff/dr-boris-kozolchykbk (last visited Oct. 20, 2016)
(providing a concise account of Dr. Kozolchyk’s academic career and role at the NLCIFT).
Dr. Kozolchyk, despite his retirement as Executive Director, will continue as a member of
the Board of Directors and Director of Research. See Leah Sandwell-Weiss, Arizona Law
Welcomes Don De Amicis as Executive Director of NatLaw, U. ARIZ. JAMES E. ROGERS C.
L. (Sept. 16, 2015), https://law.arizona.edu/arizona-law-welcomes-don-de-amicis-executive
-director-natlaw.
76
See Kozolchyk, Trans-Pacific, supra note 4, at 44–49.
77
Id. at 49.
78
Id. at 48.
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with detailed explanations of the reasons for objections, in an effort to identify the
true “reasons for their disparate practices.”79
Yet Kozolchyk’s most important achievement, and perhaps the polar star
for CCC, is the OAS Model Law on Secured Transactions.80 Here too the
emergence of agreed principles was made possible only through detailed study of
relevant sectoral practices. In Mexico, for example, this included, among other
things: the role of national identity cards in determining the legal status of
debtors; the typical reliance of poor farmers on usurious lenders in Mexican
agriculture; the lack of a reliable system for cattle identification; and the practice
of not producing reliable records to identify the value of potential collateral
because doing so would undercut efforts to avoid tax collection.81 It should be
noted that the Model Law on Secured Transactions is one of the chief
accomplishments of the CIDIP process under the OAS, with, unlike so many other
products of the CIDIP process, increasing prospects for implementation
throughout the Western Hemisphere.82
In all of these efforts, grounded on a deep understanding of the facts,
Kozolchyk’s approach then called upon the parties to employ what Kozolchyk
calls the “logic of the reasonable.”83 Sometimes this entailed asking parties to set
aside their prejudices, including the claim of “cultural imperialism,” under which
it was asked “‘Why is it that Mexico must import its trade and commercial laws
from Canada and the United States and the same is not true the other way
around?’”84 It is not the logic of the rational or mere deductive logic. It is, rather,
“inseparably linked to transaction facts and sectoral facts,” and the success of
these efforts demonstrated that “commercial lawyers who are trained as
comparative and contextual analyst are the best equipped to determine who should
be treated fairly, i.e., as equals or better, and who should not.”85 For Kozolchyk,
when theory and practice meet, progress becomes possible—a somewhat ironic
legacy for a refugee, like Kozolchyk, who left behind a political system in Cuba
ostensibly committed to the Marxist belief in the so-called unity of theory and
practice.86 Since Kozolchyk and Marx no doubt do not share common ground in
79

Id. at 47.
See OAS, Model Secured Transactions, supra note 11.
81
See KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 75–79. See also Boris Kozolchyk & Dale
Furnish, The OAS Model Law on Secured Transactions: A Comparative Analysis, 12 SW. J.
L. & TRADE AM. 235 (2006); Boris Kozolchyk & John M. Wilson, The Organization of
American States: The New Model Inter-American Law on Secured Transactions 7 UNIF. L.
REV. 69 (2002) (providing a more detailed exposition of the drafting process and the
elements of the OAS Model Law on Secured Transactions).
82
See Boris Kozolchyk, Implementation of the OAS Model Law in Latin America:
Current Status, 28 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (2011) (reporting on developments and
adoptions in the first decade of the Model Law’s availability).
83
See Kozolchyk, Trans-Pacific, supra note 4, at 55.
84
KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 73.
85
Kozolchyk, Trans-Pacific, supra note 4, at 55.
86
See Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 107, 109
(Robert C. Tucker ed., 1972) (stating in Thesis XI: “The philosophers have only interpreted
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what this means, it might be better to say that his methods realize the vision of the
hedgehog with the skills of the fox.
By contrast, in this author’s experience as a member of the OAS InterAmerican Juridical Committee (IJC) from 2005 to 2008, failed CIDIP exercises
are characterized by approaches that fail to unify theory and practice. To evaluate
this claim, however, one needs to understand the historical context for the role of
the IJC and the CIDIP process as vehicles for private international law
cooperation in the Western Hemisphere, which can in fact be traced to the
beginnings of the Inter-American legal community at the end of the 19th
century.87 For Latin Americans, much of the mythology of private international
law cooperation is based on the signal achievement in the early 20th century of the
promulgation of the so-called Bustamante Code (in honor of its chief draftsman,
the Cuban professor Antonio Sánchez de Bustamante y Sirvén) at the Sixth
International Conference of American States at Havana in 1928.88 Drawing on
earlier work of the civilian countries in the region, the Code was in fact a set of
choice-of-law rules, rather than a set of substantive principles for private law
harmonization.89
When, after a series of procedural and institutional transformations, the
IJC as the chief legal advisory organ of the OAS emerged as the successor to the
committee responsible for the Bustamante Code, it seemed natural for the IJC,
whose members are elected by the General Assembly of the OAS,90 to take up the
task of harmonizing the civilian-inspired choice-of-law rules adopted at the prewar Havana Conference with the choice-of-law rules of the United States. But as
luck and fate would have it, the attempt at choice-of-law harmonization was
doomed from the start: first, federalist concerns prevented US negotiators from
accepting the possibility that choice-of-law rules could be the subject of a federal
treaty harmonizing US rules with civilian methods; and second, at precisely that
moment, US courts were beginning to fashion a choice-of-law revolution that
began to displace largely territorialist, choice-of-law rules, inspired by civil law,
the world, in various way; the point, however, is to change it” (emphasis added)). For the
full-blown explication of this view, see Karl Marx, The German Ideology, Part I, in THE
MARX-ENGELS READER, supra at 110.
87
See Antonio F. Perez, The Inter-American Juridical Committee and Private
International Law in the Americas (or a Roadmap for Making the Best the Enemy of the
Good), in EL COMITÉ JURÍDICO INTERAMERICANO: UN SIGLO DE APORTES AL DERECHO
INTERNACIONAL 299, 300–05 (2007) [hereinafter Perez, IAJC] (discussing the pre-history
of the OAS and IJC in the Montevideo Conferences of 1888-89 and 1939-40); see also
Antonio Perez, Consumer Protection in the Americas: A Second Wave of American
Revolutions?, 5 ST. THOMAS L. J. 698 (2008) [hereinafter Perez, Second Wave] (providing
an economic analysis, taking into account national and regional market differences, of the
need for greater consumer protection, also as a vehicle for greater empowerment of
disadvantaged groups of consumers and producers).
88
See Perez, IAJC, supra note 87, at 305 n.28 (citation omitted).
89
See id. at 310–11.
90
See Charter of the Organization of American States art. 101, Apr. 30, 1948, 119
U.N.T.S. 3.
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with so-called governmental interest and other methodologies. The retreat from
civilian-inspired territorialism in US conflicts doctrine thus reduced the likelihood
of agreement on a common theoretical approach. Indeed, the US choice-of-law
“revolution” included even methods that were variants on ancient attempts to find
the “best” or at least “better” law in multi-state transactions, much as the praetor
peregrinus through edicts governing disputes between Romans and non-Romans
in antiquity fashioned the so-called jus gentium.91 Looking at the content of the
law and its quality was as far away as one could imagine from the traditional
civilian method of choosing the law of a jurisdiction without regard to that law’s
content or quality.
However, the IJC’s persistence in seeking to resurrect the Bustamante
Code in effect marginalized it, as the OAS member states voted to create an
alternative process involving representatives of the member states and private
sector representatives, the CIDIP, which might prove more productive.92 The new
CIDIP process disdained efforts to resurrect the Bustamante Code and pursued a
more pragmatic agenda. It lowered its sights even in pursuing private
international law conventions; rather than embarking on wholly new projects, it
merely adapted some of the instruments produced at the universal Hague
Conference on Private International Law to serve Latin American needs.93 More
importantly, by the mid-1990s, the CIDIP began to focus on the possibility of
substantive law harmonization—with the breakthrough coming in 1996 in the
aftermath of the eruption of free trade instruments during that period, when the
OAS General Assembly specifically approved the promotion of instruments to
promote free trade. With this new impetus, the CIDIP produced Model Laws that
could serve to harmonize substantive private law rules and help to create a level
playing field for market participants throughout the Americas. It was in this
context that the CIDIP, with the able assistance of Kozolchyk and the NLCIFT,
were able to produce the Model Law on Secured Transactions and its successor
projects.94
Tragically, it was only in the aftermath of the failed effort to produce a
free trade agreement for the whole hemisphere that the issue of consumer
protection emerged as a priority topic in the CIDIP agenda.95 The effort might
have been a bridge too far to begin with; for, unlike prior CIDIP topics, the
consumer protection problem could be viewed from the lens of overall distributive
justice and the special role of the state in protecting the community from mass
tort.96 But as it turned out, the issue simply became a vehicle for replaying the
struggles of the past between those who would pursue efforts to allocate
sovereignty through choice-of-law rules on one hand and, on the other, those who
91

See Perez, IAJC, supra note 87, at 310–17 (citations omitted).
See id. at 317–24 (citations omitted).
93
See id. at 324–27 (citations omitted).
94
See id. at 327–28 n.129.
95
See MICHAEL REID, THE FORGOTTEN CONTINENT: THE BATTLE
AMERICA’S SOUL 309 (2007).
96
See Perez, Second Wave, supra note 87, at 701.
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wished to focus on the substantive contract rules that (taking into account the need
of all stakeholders for fair and reasonable protection of their interests) might
afford consumers effective protection.
The United States, Canada, and Brazil each submitted proposals for
instruments. Brazil, recalling the methods of the Bustamante Code, proposed a
choice-of-law treaty with a wrinkle. Under Brazil’s proposal the law of the
consumer’s home would govern, except that when the contract contained a choiceof-law clause the “law most favorable to the consumer” would then govern.
Nothing in the proposal made clear the criteria that would be used to determine
which country’s law was “most favorable” or even what constituted the relevant
“law” on the question.97 The Canadian treaty proposal, informed by civil law
thought but practically directed primarily at electronic commerce, purported to
regulate jurisdiction, enabling consumers to sue anywhere a seller or producer’s
assets could be found; yet the proposal, like the Brazilian proposal, included
choice-of-law rules applying the consumer’s home forum law, also ignoring the
parties’ choice of law (albeit not when “the vendor demonstrates that he or she
took reasonable steps to avoid concluding consumer contracts with consumers
residing” in the consumer’s home state).98 The US proposal, by contrast, included
a set of model laws and legislative guides taking account of the public law
dimension of consumer protection, including: draft models laws for strengthening
governmental consumer protection authorities; simplified tribunals for small
consumer claims; collective or representational dispute resolution and redress for
common injuries to consumers; and electronic arbitration of small claims. The US
proposal thus focused on mechanisms to generate effective remedies in private
adjudication and, when small claims could not be cost-effectively pursued in
ordinary adjudication, instead through governmental or collective (such as class
action) mechanisms. The US proposal was a harmonization scheme targeting the
law of remedies, designed to ensure that innocent consumers—like bona fide
purchasers for value who can negotiate or collect on instruments in their
possession or innocent creditors able to enforce their rights through self-help in
taking possession of collateral without a breach of the peace—are protected
through effective remedial mechanisms.99
It should be noted that these disagreements were replicated at the level of
the IJC, where multiple reporters reflecting these competing views were unable to
forge a common position to enable the IJC to participate effectively in the CIDIP
process as counselor or intermediary.100 Given the incommensurability of these
97

See id. at 702–03 (citations omitted).
Id. at 703.
99
See id.
100
See Organization of American States, Annual Report of the Inter-American
Juridical Committee to the General Assembly 2006, OEA/Ser.Q/VI.37 CJI/doc 237/06
(Aug. 7-25, 2006), http://www.oas.org/en/sla/iajc/docs/INFOANUAL.CJI.2006.ING.pdf.
One might compare the different analytical approaches of the members assigned to monitor
CIDIP developments for the IJC. This author, who was then a member of the IJC,
submitted an individual report reflecting a pragmatic, common law orientation. See id. at
98
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approaches, it should not be surprising that no progress has been made in either
forum. Indeed, because of the impasse, the General Assembly of the OAS
ultimately removed the issue from the CIDIP agenda and, as reported to the IJC
by the OAS Secretariat’s Legal Director Dante Negro, “the topic was sent back to
the Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs via the Permanent Council”101—
thus bringing to an end a misbegotten effort to impose abstract choice-of-law
treaty solutions in the absence of the kind of factual knowledge and practical
inquiry that preceded the success of the Model Law on Secured Transactions.
Adding insult to injury, he “used the opportunity to urge the Committee to present
new topics or proposals that might be of interest for future contributions.”102
The message was clear: neither the IJC nor CIDIP could make progress
on consumer protection issues while they remained deadlocked on fundamental
questions of methodology. And the IJC seemed to get the message. In a search
for new issues that would enable it to “contribute to these issues without falling
prey to the paralysis of the last CIDIP,” the IJC added to its agenda the study of “a
uniform law governing customs receipts relating to the transportation of
agricultural products.”103 While mundane, this decision signaled a return to the
course that produced the Model Law on Secured Transactions. Although progress
remains glacial, it should be noted that the IJC’s work is being slowed, not by
theoretical concerns, but rather by resource limitations in convening the
substantive experts whose knowledge is essential to producing an instrument that
76–78. The Salvadoran member, Dr. Ana Elizabeth Villalta Vizcarra, submitted a report
drawing on the civil law tradition that favored the Brazilian proposal. See id. at 66–71.
Interestingly, however, a third reporter, the Brazilian member of the committee, despite his
civil law orientation, joined the US reporter to express concern about the legal uncertainty
that would be generated by the Brazilian proposal for a choice-of-law treaty. See id. at 78–
79. These tensions continue to characterize the IJC’s deliberations, with even more
extensive and divergent reports as the parallel CIDIP process also could not bridge its
differences. See Organization of American States, Annual Report of the Inter-American
Juridical Committee to the General Assembly 2007, OEA/Ser.Q/VII.38 CJI/doc.286/07
(Aug. 10, 2007), http://www.oas.org/en/sla/iajc/docs/INFOANUAL.CJI.2007.ING.pdf;
Organization of American States, Annual Report of the Inter-American Juridical
Committee to the General Assembly 2008, OEA/Ser.Q/VI.39 CJI/doc.316/08 (Aug. 14,
2008), http://www.oas.org/en/sla/iajc/docs/INFOANUAL.CJI.2008.ENG.pdf. Finally, Dr.
Villalta and the author’s successor at the IJC, David Stewart, reported to the IJC that the
CIDIP process on consumer protection issues had come to an “impasse” and, in Stewart’s
words, “the current situation does not give much room for any action by the Juridical
Committee” and the IJC “would have to await the outcome of the negotiations of the
countries” before it “could resume the active role it had been playing in the process for
codification of private international law.” Organization of American States, Annual Report
of the Inter-American Juridical Committee to the General Assembly 2009,
OEA/Ser.Q/XIX.40 CJI/doc.425/12 (Aug. 14, 2009), http://www.oas.org/en/sla/iajc/docs
/INFOANUAL.CJI.2009.ENG.pdf [hereinafter OAS, 2009 Annual Report].
101
OAS, 2009 Annual Report, supra note 100.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 129 (selecting the US member, David Stewart, as the IJC’s reporter for this
new project).
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could have the desired practical effects.104 This kind of glacial progress is best,
for “it makes haste slowly.”105
Comparing the effects of Dr. Kozolchyk’s participation in the CIDIP
process with the failed efforts to address the problem of consumer protection as a
spur to trade, one might generalize, following the work of Friedrich Jeunger, the
noted comparativist and conflict of laws scholar, that choice of law methods of
various forms have failed to achieve anything of permanent value and should be
discarded and replaced with an honest pursuit of the best law that should govern
multi-state transactions.106 As shown by Kozolchyk’s successful work and the
failed counter-example of the IJC and CIDIP’s effort to improve cooperation on
consumer protection, abstract choice-of-law theorizing distracts states from
developing effective mechanisms for consumer protection that take into account
the diversity of settings and interests of the countries involved. It appears, rather,
that the sine qua non for progress at the IJC and CIDIP is to follow Kozolchyk’s
methodology: grasp fully the facts on the ground through conversation with all
interested stakeholders, and seek to reach agreement on the basis of the best
practices of the archetypal merchant or market-participant, Ulpian’s bonus vir.
Indeed, that learning process may have already begun. The failed
consumer protection effort, coupled with the well-received Model Law on
Secured Transactions, seem to have prompted the OAS and its CIDIP process to
move in a direction suggest by Kozolchyk’s CCC. Now, with an effort to produce
a new Model Law for Warehouse Receipts for Agricultural Products, the IJC’s
membership seems to recognize the relationship between legal harmonization,
especially with respect to documents covering goods, and the flow of commerce
and credit, especially for small- and medium-sized enterprises;107 and that
104
See Organization of American States, Annual Report of the Inter-American
Juridical Committee to the General Assembly 2015, at 42, OEA/Ser.Q CJI/doc.495/15
(Sept. 8, 2015), http://scm.oas.org/pdfs/2016/CP35451EREPORTCJI.pdf [hereinafter OAS,
2015 Annual Report]. See also Organization of American States, Annual Report of the
Inter-American Juridical Committee to the Forty-Fourth Regular Session of the General
Assembly, at 104–112, OEA/Ser.G CP/doc.4956/14 (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.oas.org
/en/sla/iajc/docs/INFOANUAL.CJI.2013.ENG.pdf (providing a useful study by the IJC
reporter drawing on Kozolchyk’s methodology in order to construct a set of principles to
govern warehouse receipts, akin to Kozolchyk’s principles for a model law on Model Law
on Secured Transactions).
105
The phrase, “festina lente,” is attributed to Augustus Caesar and is deemed a
reflection of his wisdom. See Festina Lente, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki
/Festina_lente (last visited Oct 21, 2016).
106
See generally FRIEDRICH JEUNGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE
(1993) (calling, in effect, for a return to the methods of the Roman praetor peregrinus,
whose edicts governing cases between Romans and non-Romans gave rise to the so-called
jus gentium).
107
See OAS, 2015 Annual Report, supra note 104, at 36 (stressing “the positive
effects that developments in electronic warehouse receipts for agricultural products could
have on the economics of the countries, particularly on small-scale agricultural goods
producing companies”).
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recognition may now benefit from the fertile ground that may now be emerging
with pro-market political and economic reform in the region.108 In short, if Latin
Americans are to realize fully their potential for economic and human
development, Kozolchyk’s insight that reciprocal altruism and the protection of
strangers (including consumers and small businesses seeking entry in foreign
markets) rather than excessive preferences for insiders (such as kin and even
nationals) must become the organizing principle for commercial law in the
Americas.
IV. NEW CHALLENGES IN GLOBAL PRO-DEVELOPMENT PRIVATE
LAW HARMONIZATION
Even if Kozolchyk’s methodology is a sine qua non for progress in
private law harmonization, it may not be a sufficient condition. Cultural change
may be necessary, especially in the case of the Latin and Asian cultures, which
Kozolchyk shows are permeated by familism. After describing the impediments
familism creates in Latin America for the acceptance of legal rules that protect
third parties, and the encouragement it gives to simulated practices to conceal
illegality or other forms of corruption in order to privilege kin and other
insiders,109 CCC includes three full chapters on the roots and nature of the Chinese
commercial legal system, drawing attention to the fact that Chinese commercial
law, like Latin American law,110 has been culturally constrained in its protection
of third-parties.111
108
See Shannon K. O'Neil, Argentina and Brazil Grow Together, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL.: LATIN AMERICA’S MOMENT (July 15, 2016), http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil
/2016/07/15/argentina-and-brazil-grow-together/ (discussing recent political and economic
changes in Brazil and Argentina).
109
See KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 475–543.
110
Id. at 476. Kozolchyk notes: “Surprisingly, especially to someone born and raised
in Latin America, the early legal cultures of Latin America and China had important
elements in common. In addition to the not-very-dissimilar versions of familism and
legalism, including a tendency to monopolize commerce and to treat contracting parties
who are members of the extended family better than non-members, pre-colonial and
colonial Latin America and Chinese ‘commoners’ shared another important attitude: their
respect for and obedience to those who were their social, political and military hierarchical
superiors. In the case of the family, the obedience was to the patrilineal hierarchy, and
where legalism was concerned, the obedience to the chieftain (caudillo) warlord or emperor
was strengthened by their being equated by the governed to heads of their family
households.” Id. For Kozolchyk, familism in these contexts means “a legal culture whose
institutions are designed to protect the best interests of the family as an economic unit,
including actual and ‘fictive’ kin members (such as the Mexican compadre or the Chinese
Guanxi) and economic dependents, at the expense of the ‘strangers’ or ‘third parties.’”
Legalism means “the method of enacting and enforcing laws by authoritative rulers
accompanied by an appearance of having observed lawful procedures. It is only an
appearance because these rulers do not reflect the consent of the governed any more than
they are the product of the wisdom or higher morality of the ruler. At their most basic,
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But Kozolchyk also makes an important allusion to the tensions that are
being created in the world economy’s efforts to integrate China in his discussion
of the emergence of the modern LOC. Because of disputes concerning charges for
a “negotiation commission” to “beneficiaries” by negotiating, issuing and
confirming banks, so simple a term as “negotiation” was in urgent need of
clarification. Kozolchyk observed that “[s]ince the claims of fraudulent tender of
documents multiplied during the 1980s, especially with the large volume of
shipments to and from China, this legal clarification was of considerable
commercial and economic significance.”112 Implicitly, if not explicitly, this
account draws attention to the question of the implications of traditional patterns
of Chinese culture and economy for global legal harmonization.
This review concludes, therefore, with a discussion of the key causes for
concern about Chinese culture and law in the context of the requirements for
effectiveness set forth in CCC. It then locates Kozolchyk’s concerns in a larger
literature (which is of relevance both to Latin America and China) about the
transformation of traditional kinship patterns of trust into alternative models that
provide greater cultural acceptance for the protection of strangers or could,
alternatively, erode the progress that has been made in building the cultural habits
underlying laws that protect strangers. A capsule summary of chapters 17 through
19 of CCC in no way does justice to the complexities of Chinese history, law, and
culture. But for those without a prior background in this subject, these chapters
are essential reading, for they reveal core concerns about the future that are
implicit in Kozolchyk’s account of how the rise of China destabilized modern
LOC practices. Those concerns may even include the possible threat China could
pose to the Western cultural habits that have given rise to the creditor-protecting
instruments that are now key vehicles for the reduction of global poverty.
Kozolchyk’s three chapters lay the foundations of Chinese commercial
law in historic Chinese culture, then discuss imperial and Maoist law, and then
culminate with an analysis of current Chinese law of commercial contracts. The
first—and perhaps most important—point Kozolchyk uncovers is that the father of
Chinese thought, Confucius, placed merchants at the bottom of China’s intensely
hierarchical social order, for “all they cared about was their ‘gain’ or profitmaking.”113 The intensity of familism in defiance of public norms, like Mexico’s
compadrazgo and every Mexican’s “natural right to smuggle,” while traditional
Chinese culture justifies the refusal of a son, as an “upright” man, to turn his own
father in to the authorities even when the father had committed a crime.114
these legalistic rules reflect the coercive power and pleasure of the sovereign or ruler.” Id.
at 475. Not surprisingly, when familism and legalism combine, the basic legitimacy of
formally-enacted law is perilous at best.
111
See id. at 623–746.
112
KOZOLCHYK, CCC, supra note 4, at 1067.
113
Id. at 635 n.61 (citing leading Chinese historians JOHN FAIRBANK & MERLE
GOLDMAN, A NEW HISTORY 108 (2006)).
114
Id. at 640 (quoting the teachings in writings attributed to CONFUCIUS, THE
ANALECTS (c. 500 B.C.E)) (citations omitted).
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Merchants lacked autonomy, moreover, as they became adjuncts of the imperial
bureaucracy’s monopolization of the sale and distribution of scarce commodities
and the metallic coin that served as the medium of exchange.115 Even when
merchants achieved limited autonomy, exclusive dealing arrangements between
the state and merchants continued to reinforce patterns of patronage, ultimately
forging, “after a longstanding relationship of reciprocal services and duties had
been established between the parties to this relationship,” a “living law” that “was,
and still is, known as Guanxi.”116
The practical effects of this cultural background in commercial law
development in China are myriad, and a detailed summary is beyond the scope of
this review. But suffice it to say that, as in Latin America, third-party rights were
subordinated to familial interests.117 Not surprisingly, notwithstanding the Maoist
effort to revolutionize society and even human nature, habitual indifference to
third-party interests continued; but now the interests of collective farms
substituted for privileged interests of families and their extended Guanxi
networks.118 For Kozolchyk, notwithstanding Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatism,119
the legacy of Chinese familism and authoritarian-legalism continues today.
Critically, law remains imprecise and therefore “invertebrate,”120 so much so that
ill-defined property rights make it impossible for secured creditors to have
confidence in the enforceability of their rights to collateral (not title, given the
abolition of private property in land, but long-term leaseholds) in real property,121
much less movable property or intangibles such as accounts receivables.122 Thus,
the weakness of commercial law continues to facilitate commerce through
Guanxi, even as the PRC seeks to join the world economy. It is, therefore, not
surprising that Kozolchyk drew special attention to the role of Guanxi in destabilizing LOC practices as global trade with China expanded.123 Kozolchyk’s
account seems to suggest that these cultural legacies, as in Latin America, might
set an upper-bound to the PRC’s efforts to modernize.124 Could it even be argued
that trade with China on Chinese cultural terms will de-stabilize the cultural
inheritance of non-Chinese participants in Chinese commerce?
115
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Id. at 707–37.
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China and Latin America (Apr. 11, 2008) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Southern
Florida),
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Francis Fukuyama, in a work that might have informed Kozolchyk’s
CCC, presciently argued that “social trust” is a critical variable in economic
development. He posited that when cultures evidence a high degree of trust
among social groups beyond the family, even business enterprises can trust each
other, business costs are thereby reduced, and a comparative advantage in
economic development arises.125 Drawing on the work of Max Weber, Fukuyama
argued that “there are ethical habits, such as the ability to associate spontaneously,
that are crucial to organization innovation and therefore to the creation of wealth.
Different types of ethical habits are conducive to alternative forms of economic
organization and lead to large variation in economic structure.”126 But, he argues,
at a minimum the decline of trust serves as a tax on the economy, even if some
partial substitution of its benefits can be achieved through vertical integration of
economic activities rather than relying on contract parties for goods and services.
Fukuyama notes that “[w]ithout trust, there will be a strong incentive to bring
these activities in-house and restore the old hierarchies.”127 He also seeks to
correct what he considers a common misconception about the United States and
Japan; these are, in his view, historically high-trust societies, which have been
populated with many intermediate groups between the family and the state, thus
facilitating low-cost business cooperation and thus, even without state support, the
creation of large business organizations.128 By contrast, he argues, the “nature of
Chinese Confucianism . . . may mean that China may never be able to duplicate
Japan’s development path.”129 It goes without saying, however, that Fukuyama’s
conjecture concerning China’s capacity for development and technological
development remains a highly contested question.130
125

See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES & THE CREATION OF
PROSPERITY 34 (1995) [hereinafter FUKUYAMA, TRUST].
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Id. at 37 (citing MAX WEBER, PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM
(1905), which attributed the emergence of the social “capital” of spontaneous sociability to
shared participation in religious activities). Kozolchyk’s discussion of the rise of GermanJewish merchants as trusted intermediaries in medieval and modern commerce is an insight
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153–63, 397–407.
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FUKUYAMA, TRUST, supra note 125, at 25; see also Richman, supra note 54
(observing that the decline of trust in the New York City diamond dealers’ market was
accompanied by the rise of vertical integration, thus eliminating the dealers as
intermediaries between diamond producers and consumers, in the diamond industry as a
whole).
128
FUKUYAMA, TRUST, supra note 125, at 28.
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Id. at 31, 57. For an assessment paralleling the commonality Kozolchyk finds
between China and Latin America, which Fukuyama extends to, among others, France and
portions of Italy, see id. at 5–56.
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See Emily Rauhala, Behind the Firewall: How China Tamed the Internet—
America Wants to Believe China Can’t Innovate. Tech Tells a Different Story, WASH. POST
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More important for Kozolchyk’s vision for improving global commercial
law, however, is Fukuyama’s central thesis: that is, the potential for the
dissolution of trust. Along with what later became a chorus of commentators,
Fukuyama observed that US society is witnessing the erosion of the social capital
he considered the well-spring of economic growth.131 If anything, the tendencies
Fukuyama described twenty years ago have accelerated.132 Moreover, if the
literature concerning the decline of spontaneous sociability in the United States is
correct in its assessments,133 there is no reason to believe that the decline in this
social capital will not have implications for the character of US merchants, their
lawyers, and ultimately the kind of corporate and commercial law that is
sustainable in the United States. Perhaps the popular belief in the rise of “crony
capitalism” in so many sectors of our economy is connected to this putative
cultural erosion?134 Moreover, it would be hard to imagine that the ethical habits
of US merchants and their lawyers would not erode as well when they must
habitually operate in contexts dominated by familism or authoritarian-legalist
methods.
In sum, if commercial law is built on culture, and culture is the
transmission of ethical habits,135 then, as Fukuyama has observed, cultural habits
can unravel in the same way that they can be formed. Is there a law of nature
guaranteeing that the cultural habits Kozolchyk deems essential to effective
commercial law will survive as globalization proceeds? Of course not. These
values and habits may well recede in the next century, just as they receded in the
131

FUKUYAMA, TRUST, supra note 125, at 269–321.
See ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE (2000) (detailing the disintegration of
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INDIVIDUALISM (2016) (calling for the revival of institutions, such as churches, unions, and
charities, to intermediate between the family and the state). The cumulative theme in these
volumes, as foreseen by Fukuyama, is concern for an increasing alienation and declining
sociability across all segments of American society, thereby reducing social capital
understood as solidarity and trust.
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The study of social networks is receiving extensive empirical and theoretical
attention in a range of disciplines, giving rise to the hope that a better understanding of how
social capital evolves or devolves may soon become available. See, e.g., DAVID EASLEY &
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past. For, perhaps, it was declining spontaneous sociability—depriving Christian
peasants of protection from rapacious landowners who provided credit only on
usurious terms—that prompted Emperor Constantine’s repeal of the Pactum
Commissorium.136 If so, a decline in cultural capital at the end of antiquity may
have been the root cause of the reduced flow of credit and access to a means for
escaping poverty and dependency. Yet, if global commercial culture does indeed
devolve in the next century, as it may have in the past, it will not be because Boris
Kozolchyk failed to do his duty as teacher, scholar, practitioner, and inspiration to
the next generation of commercial lawyers.
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